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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is before this Court pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The policy issued by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Bear 
River") to David and Deanna Williams (hereinafter "Williams") specifically excludes 
coverages for damages caused by vandalism and malicious mischief when property has been 
vacant for more than 30 consecutive days. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the 
trial court correctly determined that since Williams' home had been vacant for more than 
thirty consecutive days prior to the loss, the loss was a result of vandalism and malicious 
mischief, which was excluded by Bear River's policy. 
As to the standard of review, the appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
Williams also contend there is an issue as to whether the trial court correctly 
determined that there were no issues of disputed fact precluding the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Bear River. Williams did not identify this issue in their Rule 9 
Docketing Statement, as they were required to do and, therefore, the Court should not 
consider this issue. However, in the event the Court decides to consider such, Bear River has 
addressed this issue in the Argument section below. 
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Williams address an additional argument Bear River presented in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the trial court below that there is no coverage afforded by the Bear 
River policy because the vacant Williams house was not being used for dwelling purposes 
at the time the fire occurred. However, that argument was not a basis of the trial court's 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Bear River and, consequently, is not an issue 
on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Bear River filed a declaratory action with the trial court, asking 
the court to declare that there is no coverage for damage done to property owned by the 
Williams because: (1) the damage to the Williams' property was caused by an act of 
vandalism and malicious mischief while the property had been vacant for more than 30 
consecutive days; and (2) at the time of the loss the property was not being used principally 
for dwelling purposes as required by the policy. 
Course of Proceedings and its Disposition in the Trial Court: At the conclusion 
of discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted 
Bear River's motion for summary judgment and denied Williams' motion for summary 
judgment. (See Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bear River, attached hereto 
as Addendum A.) Williams now appeal the trial court's decision granting Bear River's 
motion for summary judgment. 
Facts of the Case: Bear River issued a Homeowners Insurance Property policy to 
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Williams for property they owned at 1163 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Williams property".) (See Applicable Insurance Policy, 
Addendum B, R. 8-29.) 
The policy extends coverage to the Williams' property subject to the terms, 
conditions, limitations, restrictions and exclusions listed in the policy. (See Applicable 
Insurance Policy, p. 1, Addendum B, R. 8-29.) 
The policy contains a provision that excludes coverage for damage to the Williams 
property if the damage is a result of an act of vandalism and malicious mischief when the 
Williams' property has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days before the loss. 
(See Applicable Insurance Policy, Addendum B, p. 4, R. 12.) 
The Williams, at all relevant times, were and are owners of the Williams property. 
(See Williams' Answer to Declaratory Complaint, ^ 3, R. 33.) The Williams property was 
used as a rental property by the Williamses until August 2002. (See Williams' Answer to 
Declaratory Complaint, If 18 R. 34.) However, from August 2002 to July 3, 2003, the 
Williams property was vacant and the windows and doors were boarded up. (See Williams' 
Answer to Declaratory Complaint, % 19, R. 34; David Williams Deposition, p. 39,11. 18-21, 
p. 43,11. 21-23, p.44,11. 15-19, R. 107-109; See Photographs of Williams'property, R. 148-
155.) 
From the time the last tenants vacated the Williams property in August 2002, until 
July 3,2003, all utilities, including gas, power, water, and telephone had been shut off and/or 
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were not in service. (See David Williams Deposition, p. 46,11. 5-8 and 21-23, R. I l l ; See 
Public Utility Records, R. 117-132.) 
In between August 2002 to July 3, 2003, there were several episodes of individuals 
breaking and entering into the Williams property and responding officers noted that the 
Williams property was vacant and abandoned. (See Police Records, R. 133-136.) 
In addition, in between August 2002 to July 3,2003, Salt Lake City Corporation sent 
several notices to Williams advising them that the property was vacant, unsecured, 
improperly boarded and that the property was likely to become a haven for vagrants. (See 
Letters From Salt Lake City Corp. R. 137-141.) 
On July 3,2003, approximately 11 months since the Williams property had been lived 
in, a fire occurred, causing significant damage to such. (See Affidavit of Rex Nelson, R. 142-
144; See Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147.) 
Two fire investigators, Rex Nelson and Jeffrey Long, conducted separate 
investigations to determine the cause and origin of the fire. Both investigators reached the 
conclusion that: (1) the origin of the fire was at the bottom of the doorway leading into the 
Williams property; (2) debris piled up at the bottom of the doorway where the fire originated 
was used as fuel to ignite the fire; (3) no evidence of accidental causes were discovered that 
would have caused or contributed to the fire; (4) and the fire resulted from an act of arson 
with the willful intent to cause damage to the home by an individual using available 
combustibles and a hand-held flame. (See Affidavit of Rex Nelson, R. 142-144; See 
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Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147; See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 22,11. 6-25,j>. 23,11. 
1 -16, p. 29,11. 18-23, p. 30,11. 3-6, p. 31,11. 1-9, p. 33,11. 5-9, p. 36,11. 11-14, p. 37,11. 17-24, 
R. 156-164; See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 13,11. 9-14, p. 14,11. 7-17. p. 16,11. 10-14, p. 
17,11. 2-6, p. 25,11. 3-12, p. 26,11. 5-9, p. 29,11. 1-6, p. 32,11. 14-18, p. 33,11. 7-12, p. 34,11. 
4-25, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 165-178.) 
Williams presented a claim with Bear River, demanding that it provide coverage for 
the damages done as a result of the fire. (See R. 196.) 
Bear River determined that the loss would not be covered by the policy of insurance, 
Bear River filed a declaratory action, asking the trial court to find no coverage for the 
damage to the Williams' property because: (1) the damage resulted from an act of vandalism 
and malicious mischief while the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days 
before the fire and the Williams' property was not being used principally used for dwelling 
purposes at the time of the fire. (See Declaratory Complaint, R. 1-7.) 
Williams have conceded that the home was vacant for more than 30 consecutive days 
before the fire. (See Williams' Answer to Declaratory Complaint, f^ 19 R. 34 .) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Bear River. The 
damage done to the Williams' property resulted from an act of vandalism and malicious 
mischief when the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days. Arson is a 
form of vandalism and malicious mischief. 
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The exclusion in the policy is clear and unambiguous. A reasonable purchaser of 
insurance would understand that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the policy, 
losses to the insured premises-when the premises have been vacant for more than thirty 
consecutive days-which are a result of vandalism and malicious mischief (including arson) 
are not covered by the policy. 
Furthermore, there are no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude granting 
Bear River's Motion for Summary Judgment. Two expert fire investigators concluded that 
the fire was an act of arson. Williams have failed to produce any evidence to suggest that 
the fire was anything other than an act of vandalism and malicious mischief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. General Principles and Construction, 
Courts must accord terms contained in an insurance policy their plain and ordinary 
meaning and apply those terms as written unless the terms are ambiguous or against public 
policy. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002); Miller v. USSAA 
Casualty Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663,676 (Utah 2002); First American Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, 
Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 1998). 
If an exclusion is clear and unambiguous and does not contravene public policy, it 
must be applied as written. First American Title, 966 P.2d at 836; Village Inn Apartments 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Furthermore, an insurance contract's language must be construed according to its 
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plain and ordinary meaning and a court cannot make a forced construction or fashion a new 
contract for the parties. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Schilling, 520 N.W.2d 884, 887 
(S.D. 1994). An unambiguous policy requires no construction and its plain terms must be 
given full effect even though they are beneficial to an insurer and detrimental to the insured. 
Littrell v. Colony Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Bear River's Motion For Summary 
Judgment And Correctly Held That No Coverage Was Afforded For The 
Loss Since Williams' Property Had Been Vacant For More Than Thirty 
(30) Days Prior To The Loss And The Loss Was An Act Of Vandalism 
And Malicious Mischief 
The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Bear River should 
be upheld on appeal because the damage to the Williams property from the fire that occurred 
on July 3, 2003
 5 resulted from an act of vandalism and malicious mischief while the 
Williams' property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days before the fire. 
Bear River agreed to insure against certain types of losses to the Williams' property. 
However, it did not agree to insure losses to the Williams' property caused by vandalism and 
malicious mischief if the Williams' property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive 
days prior to the loss. Specifically, the policy states: 
PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
COVERAGE A-DWELLING and COVERAGE B-OTHER 
STRUCTURES 
We insure against risk of direct loss to property described in Coverages A and 
B only if that loss is a physical loss to property; however, we do not insure 
loss: 
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2. caused by: 
f. vandalism and malicious mischief, theft or attempted theft if the 
dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days 
immediately before the loss . . . 
(See Applicable Insurance Policy, Addendum B, p. 4, R. 12.) 
Williams admit that, at the time the fire occurred on July 3, 2003, the Williams 
property had been vacant for at least 30 consecutive days. (See Williams' Answer to 
Declaratory Complaint, ^ 19, R. 34.) If the fire was an act of vandalism or malicious 
mischief, the loss would not be covered. In seeking coverage under the policy,Williams 
claim that "arson" (i.e., the intentional setting of a fire with intent to cause damage) is not an 
act of vandalism or malicious mischief. 
Although there are no Utah cases directly addressing the vandalism/malicious 
mischief exclusion cited above in regards to arson, several courts throughout the nation have 
interpreted the same or similar provision in situations involving similar facts and found that 
arson is an act of vandalism and malicious mischief. For example, in Government Employees 
Ins. Co. v. Medley, 1998 U.S. District LEXIS 8085 (Dist. Ct. of Vir. 1998), a fire occurred 
at the insured's rental property, which had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days. 
Id. The property had been condemned by the city because it was uninhabitable, the utilities 
were cut off, the home boarded up and debris was scattered all throughout the home. Id. The 
insurance policy contained an exclusion from coverage for damage caused by vandalism or 
malicious mischief if the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days before 
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the loss. Id. The insurer retained an independent fire investigator to examine the property 
for the cause of the fire, and the city fire marshal also performed a similar investigation for 
the city. Id. Both investigators found that the fire was an act of arson even though the 
identity of the individual(s) causing the fire was unknown. Id. Accordingly, the court held 
that the policy did not extend coverage to the loss and specifically found that arson is a form 
of vandalism and malicious mischief. Id. 
In Costabile v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 193 F.Supp.2d 465 (D. Conn. 
2002), a fire occurred at the insured's rental property, which had been vacant for more than 
a year and a half Id. at 467. An independent fire investigator and the city marshal both 
concluded that the fire was the result of an act of arson. Id. at 468. In denying coverage for 
the loss, the insurer relied on the exclusion in the policy for "vandalism or malicious 
mischief when the premises are vacant or unoccupied for more than 30 consecutive days 
immediately prior to the loss. Id. The term arson was not defined in the policy. Id. The type 
of policy in that case was the same type of policy at issue in the instant case.1 
In determining whether arson is a form of vandalism or malicious mischief, the court 
stated that "because vandalism is not defined by the policy, under the Connecticut Rules of 
Williams claim that malicious mischief/vandalism and fire are listed as separate in 
Coverage C. However, Coverage C is for damage to personal property and is not an issue 
in this case. Coverage A (Dwelling) and B (Other Structures) do not list 
mischief/vandalism and fire as separate. The same policy provisions and language were 
addressed in Costabile, where the court found that arson is a form of vandalism and found 
there would be no coverage under Coverage A and B even though mischief/vandalism 
and fire were listed separately in Coverage C. 
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Construction, it must be given its plain, ordinary meaning." Id. at 477. The court adopted 
the definitions of vandalism and arson from Webster's Dictionary. Id. Based on the 
commonality of the definitions, the court found that arson is included in the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the term "vandalism," and stated that such conclusion "is further 
supported by the weight of authority addressing vandalism exclusions under policies that 
provide all risk coverage and do not list fire and vandalism as separate causes of loss." Id. 
at 478. 
Likewise, in Estes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 45 F.Supp.2d 1227 (D. Kan. 
1999), the insured owned a home and used it for rental purposes until December 19, 1995. 
Id. at 1228. From December 19, 1995, through July 28, 1996, the home was vacant while 
the insured attempted to complete repairs demanded by the City. Id. at 1229. On or about 
July 28, 1996, an unknown individual set fire to the home. Id. The insured made a claim 
under the policy for damage done to the home. Relying on the policy exclusion which 
excluded coverage for vandalism and malicious mischief if the home was vacant for 30 days 
or more, the insurer denied coverage. Id. 
Although the policy did not define the terms "vandalism" and "arson", the court 
adopted the common definitions of those terms. Id. The court noted that the common 
definition of vandalism is "the wilful or malicious destruction or defacement of things of 
beauty or of public or private property", and that the common definition of arson is "the 
wilful malicious burning of or attempts to burn any building, structure or property of another 
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(as a house, a church, or a boat) . . . " Id., citing Webster's New International Dictionary 
(1986) at 2532 and 122. The court found that arson of a private dwelling clearly is within 
the plain and ordinary meaning of vandalism and applied the vandalism exclusion to deny 
coverage and grant the insurer's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1229. 
In American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Durrence, 872 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1989), the 
insured's home, which was used as a rental property, was destroyed by a fire set by an 
unknown arsonist. Id. At the time of the fire, the home had been vacant for several months, 
which the insured admitted in his answer. Id. at 379. The insured's policy contained a 
provision that excluded damage resulting from vandalism or malicious mischief if the 
dwelling had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days prior to the loss. Id. Based on 
that exclusion, the insurer filed a motion for summary judgment. 
The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment based on the vandalism 
exclusion, finding that "a common sense interpretation of the insurance contract 'Vandalism 
or Malicious Mischief provision which contains the 'vacancy' exclusion, suggests that it 
would apply to a fire set in a vacant house by an unknown arsonist or vandal." Id. 
In Vennemann v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 334 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2003), the insured's 
home was damaged by a fire. At the time of the fire, nobody resided in the home, but the 
insured had been engaged in sporadic remodeling projects for over two months. Id. at 773. 
The insurer denied coverage based on the exclusion in the policy which excluded coverage 
for losses caused by vandalism and malicious mischief if the dwelling had been vacant for 
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more than 30 consecutive days immediately before the loss. Id. The court held that the fire 
was an act of vandalism and malicious mischief that occurred when the home was vacant for 
at least 30 consecutive days prior to the fire.2 Id. at 774. 
In Lundquist v. Allstate Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 627 (111. Ct. App. 2000), the insured's 
home was also destroyed by fire set by arsonists. Id. at 628. At the time of the fire, nobody 
had lived in the insured's home on a full lime basis for over a year. There had been an 
incident of vandalism at the insured's home two months prior to the fire. Id. at 629. The 
insurer denied the insured's claim for damages to the home based on the "vandalism or 
malicious mischief exclusion, if the dwelling is vacant or unoccupied for more than 30 
consecutive days immediately prior to the vandalism or malicious mischief." Id. 
Again, the court found that the act of arson constituted vandalism or malicious 
mischief under the policy and that the only question was whether the home had been vacant 
for the required period of time. Id. at 630. 
Finally, in Potomac Ins. Co. of III. v. NCUA a/k/a National Credit Union Assn., 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9844 (N.D. 111. 1996), the insurer also issued an insurance policy, which 
contained an exclusion for damage occurring to the property as a result of vandalism if the 
property had been vacant for more than 60 consecutive days before the loss. Id. The insured 
premises became unoccupied and was subsequently boarded up. Id. Approximately four 
2Notably, the court stated that "a predictable pattern of habitation is significant in 
the insurance context because when a building is not in use, it is more likely that potential 
fire hazards will remain undiscovered or unremedied." Id. 
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months later, the property was set on fire by an unknown arsonist. Id. The insurer denied 
coverage based on the vandalism/vacancy exclusion. Id. 
Because the term "vandalism" was not defined in the policy, the court compared the 
dictionary definitions of "arson" and "vandalism" and concluded that arson is a type of 
vandalism. Specifically, the court stated: 
Since "vandalism" is not defined in the policy, we must afford the term its 
plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 607 N.E. 1204, 1215-16. Illinois courts often look to Webster's 
International Dictionary for guidance when defining the "usual and ordinary" 
meaning of contract language, See Id., and this source defines "vandalism" as 
the "wilful or malicious destruction or defacement of things of beauty or of 
public or private property." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
2532 (1986); Accord, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1973 (3rd Edition 1992). Similarly, arson is defined by Webster's 
as "the wilful and malicious burning of or attempt to burn any building, 
structure, or property of another (as a house, a church, or a boat) or of one's 
own [usually] with criminal or fraudulent intent." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 122 (1986); Accord, the American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 103 (3rd Edition 1992). 
Considering the sources and the ordinary meaning of the terms, it is apparent 
that arson - the wilful or malicious destruction of public or private property 
through the setting of a fire - is a type of vandalism. Although NCUA argues 
that the ordinary person would not equate serious acts of arson with petty 
instances of vandalism, we find the conclusion NCUA draws from this 
assertion - that arson does not constitute a species of vandalism - untenable. 
Rather, given the definitions quoted above and the ordinary meanings of the 
two terms, we must conclude that arson does indeed fall within the definition 
of vandalism. We are mindful of our obligation to construe policy limitations 
narrowly. Yet this principle of construction does not permit us to 
unreasonably interpret a limitation provision out of an insurance contract, but 
only to give insureds the benefit of an ambiguous term. The language of the 
Policy in this case is not ambiguous: the wilful destruction of property is not 
covered if the building has been vacant for 60 consecutive days. Under the 
facts stipulated for purposes of this motion, Gonsch's building was vacant for 
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more than 60 days prior to the fire, and the fire was intentionally set by persons 
unknown. Thus, under this set of facts, the vacancy provision in the Policy 
plainly and unambiguously eliminates coverage. Because the policy's clear 
and unambiguous terms must be applied as written, Hurst-Rosche Engineers, 
Inc., v. Commercial Unions Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1336, 1342 (7th Cir. 1995), we 
must conclude that Potomac has no coverage obligations for the damage by 
arson at the insured premises. Id. 
The majority of jurisdictions, as evidenced by the several cases cited above, have 
found that arson is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief, and have denied coverage 
on that basis where property has been vacant for 30 or more consecutive days. 
The concept of the term "vandalism" (i.e., the "wilful or malicious destruction or 
defacement of things of beauty or of public or private property"), does not limit "how" the 
vandalism takes place. A "vandal" may use a baseball bat, a spray paint, a car, a crowbar, 
a knife, or any number of other "instruments" to accomplish his wilful and malicious 
destruction. He may use his bare hands. He may use a match. The point is, focus for 
"vandalism" or "malicious mischief is not properly placed on the "means" by which the 
wilful or malicious destruction is accomplished; rather, focus is placed on the "fact" of the 
destruction itself. 
In the instant case, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the July 3,2003, fire at the 
Williams' property was an act of vandalism and malicious mischief (i.e., an intentionally set 
fire/arson). Two independent fire investigators, Rex Nelson of Salt Lake County, and Jeffrey 
Long of Fire Analysis Investigations, LLC, both came to the conclusion that, in their expert 
opinions, the July 3,2003, fire was an intentionally set fire; i.e., an act of arson. Specifically, 
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both Mr. Nelson and Mr. Long found the following as it relates to the fire: (1) the origin of 
the fire was at the bottom of a door at the Williams' property's south rear entrance; (2) there 
was debris piled up at the base of the door that was used as fuel to ignite the fire; (3) no 
accidental causes were discovered that would have caused or contributed to the origin of the 
fire; (4) the fire resulted from an act of arson with the wilful intent to cause damage to the 
home; and (5) the home had been abandoned/vacant for an extended period of time because 
all of the windows were boarded up, there was no furniture present and there was a 
significant amount of graffiti and garbage throughout the home. (See Affidavit of Rex 
Nelson, R. 142-144; See Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147; See Rex Nelson Deposition, 
p. 22,11. 6-25, p. 23,11. 1-16, p. 29,11. 18-23, p. 30,11. 3-6, p. 31,11. 1-9, p. 33,11. 5-9, p. 36, 
11. 11-14, p. 37,11. 17-24, R. 156-164; See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 13,11. 9-14, p. 14,11. 
7-17, p. 16,11. 10-14, p. 17,11. 2-6, p. 25,11. 3-12, p. 26,11. 5-9, p. 29,11. 1-6, p. 32,11. 14-18, 
p. 33,11. 7-12, p. 34,11. 4-25, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 165-178.) 
In addition to the conclusions of the fire investigators that the fire was the result of 
arson, it is important to remind the Court of the fact that the Williams' property had 
experienced several break ins and trespassing/drug incidents within the year prior to the fire. 
(See Police Records, R. 133-136.) These incidents show that, in the year before the fire, the 
Williams' property had become a haven for transients and/or other individuals engaging in 
criminal behavior, including vandalism and malicious mischief. 
Further, it is important to note (as discussed hereinafter) that Williams did not submit 
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any evidence to oppose the conclusions reached by the fire investigators nor did Williams 
submit any evidence to support any other possible cause of the fire. 
One of the purposes of the vandalism/vacancy exclusion in homeowner's policies is 
to encourage policy holders to maintain a continual presence in the home so as to guard 
against a substantial increase of risk for vandalism. Belgrade v. National American Ins. Co., 
204 Cal.App.2d 44,47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). Williams clearly failed to maintain a continual 
presence in the home. The property was vacant for at least 11 months and became a target 
for continuous criminal activity, including the fire that destroyed the home. 
Williams claim that because arson is not defined or mentioned in the policy, the term 
is ambiguous and should not be considered vandalism or malicious mischief. (See Brief of 
Appellant.) Utilizing such a position, an insurance policy would have to have an endless list 
of possible instruments of destruction. The policy would have to be co-extensive with the 
criminal imagination. The law does not impose such a duty on an insurer. Rather, the 
language of the policy-excluding coverage when a house is vacant for more than 30 
consecutive days and damage is done as a result of vandalism or malicious mischief 
(whatever the instrumentality used)-is clear, plain and unambiguous. 
As discussed above, Webster's Dictionary defines vandalism as "the wilful or 
malicious destruction or defacement of things of beauty or of public or private 
property "(note, without identifying the means by which such destruction or defacement takes 
place) and arson as "the wilful malicious burning of or attempts to burn any building, 
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structure or property of another (as a house, a church, or a boat) . . ." Id. Webster's New 
International Dictionary (1986) at 2532 and 122. 
Furthermore, the Utah criminal code states that a person is guilty of arson if the person 
by means of fire or explosives unlawfully and intentionally damages the property of 
another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102. (Emphasis added). Again, "arson" focuses on the 
"means", whereas "vandalism" focuses on the damage by whatever means. "Arson" is a 
more specific subset of vandalism. Both terms involve the wilful and malicious destruction 
of property. Arson falls within the definition of "vandalism." 
Williams have only cited two cases, Battishill v. Farmers Alliance Ins. Co. and 
American States Ins. Co. v. Rancho San Marcos Properties, LLC, in support of their 
position. However, those cases have taken a minority position on the issue of whether arson 
is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief. 
As to American States Ins. Co., that case did not even involve a building that was 
intended to be used for dwelling purposes; rather, it involved an abandoned commercial 
building. Also, the policy language in American States Ins. Co. is different. 
As to Battishill, the court based its decision, in part, on the premise that insurance 
coverage should be extended based on the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage, and 
that an insured would reasonably expect coverage for an arson fire. Battishill, 97 P.3d at 
623-26. However, "the reasonable expectations doctrine" adopted in Battishill has been 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Specifically, in Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas. 
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Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992), the appellant's child was injured while on the insured 
property. Id. at 799. The appellant subsequently tried to recover for the child's injuries on 
a homeowner's policy, which the insurer rejected based on a household exclusion. Id. at 800. 
The appellant sought to invalidate the household exclusion on the grounds that the insurance 
policy was an adhesion contract and that the exclusion violated her reasonable expectations 
of coverage. Id. However, the Utah Supreme Court rejected various versions of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine advanced by the appellant and stated: "the fact that an 
insurance contract is adhesive is no reason, in itself, to enforce what might be found to be the 
reasonable expectations of the insured when those expectations conflict with the plain terms 
of the policy." Id. at 803. "We reject the various versions of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine advanced by Allen." Id. at 807. 
In the instant case, the plain terms of the policy clearly exclude coverage for losses 
caused by vandalism and malicious mischief when the Williams' property has been vacant 
for 30 or more consecutive days. 
It is difficult to imagine an insured would have a "reasonable expectation" that 
property damaged by a baseball bat, a crowbar, spray paint, a vehicle intentionally driven into 
a building, a knife, or a multitude of other destructive means would be properly excluded 
from coverage but property damage caused by a lighted match intended to cause the same 
damage would be covered. 
In sum the vandalism/vacancy exclusion is clear and unambiguous in its inclusion of 
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arson as a type of vandalism and malicious mischief Cases throughout the country that have 
interpreted identical, or nearly identical, policy language have found such. Accordingly, the 
trial court's decision granting Bear River's Motion for Summary Judgment should be upheld. 
III. Contrary To The Williams1 Assertions Otherwise, There Are No Issues Of 
Material Fact That Would Preclude Granting Bear River's Motion For 
Summary Judgment. 
Williams argue that there is an issue as to whether the trial court correctly determined 
that there were no issues of disputed fact precluding the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Bear River. Williams did not identify this issue in the Rule 9 Docketing Statement as 
required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; rather, the only issue identified by the 
Williams in their Docketing Statement is whether the trial court correctly determined that 
arson is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief. (See Addendum C, Docketing 
Statement.) 
Because Williams did not identify the second issue, the Court should not consider 
such on appeal. However, in the event the Court decides to consider the second issue, Bear 
River presents the following: 
Williams claim that even if this Court holds that arson is a form of vandalism and 
malicious mischief, a factual issue exists because Bear River's experts cannot prove the fire 
was set with the intent to damage the Williams' property because the identity of the person(s) 
who set the fire is unknown. Williams' contentions are without support. 
In the trial court, Williams failed to offer any evidence controverting the findings of 
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Mr. Nelson and Mr. Long that the fire was intentionally set. Williams have presented no 
affidavits, no sworn testimony, no expert opinion, and no facts to controvert the expert 
opinions of the fire investigators. If such evidence did exist, which it does not, such evidence 
should have presented at the trial level; not raised in the appellate court for the first time. 
Further, both Mr. Nelson and Mr. Long found that: (1) the origin of the fire was at the 
bottom of the doorway at the Williams'; (2) debris was piled up at the bottom of the doorway 
where the fire originated and was used as fuel to ignite the fire: (3) no evidence of accidental 
causes were discovered that would have caused or contributed to the fire; and (4) the fire 
resulted from an act of arson with the willful intent to cause damage to the home by an 
individual using combustibles and a hand-held flame. (See Affidavit of Rex Nelson, R. 142-
144; See Affidavit of Jeffrey Long, R. 145-147; See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 22,11. 6-25, 
p. 23,11. 1-16, p. 29,11. 18-23, p. 30,11. 3-6, p. 31,11. 1-9, p. 33,11. 5-9, p. 36,11. 11-14, p. 37, 
11. 17-24, R. 156-164; See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 13,11. 9-14, p. 14,11. 7-17, p. 16,11. 
10-14, p. 17,11. 2-6, p. 25,11. 3-12, p. 26,11. 5-9, p. 29,11. 1-6, p. 32,11. 14-18, p. 33,11. 7-12, 
p. 34,11. 4-25, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 165-178.) 
Specifically, Mr. Nelson testified in his deposition as follows: 
Q. It's my understanding from the testimony that I've heard today that-well, 
first of all let me ask you an initial question. Would you tell us what your 
definition would be of an act of arson? 
A. Act of arson is an intentionally set fire. When I said earlier in the 
deposition it was a man caused fire that would probably be my opinion 
that it's a man caused fire and it most likely is arson. 
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(See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 29,11. 24-25, p. 30,11. 1-6, R. 159-160.) 
Mr. Nelson further testified as follows: 
Q. As a fire investigator is it your experience that you can generally 
determine the cause and origin of a fire without identifying the identity 
of the person or source that set the fire? 
A. Sure. 
Q. And can you also determine that a fire was intentionally set without 
knowing the identity of the individual that set the fire? 
A. Sure. 
Q. And in this case, based on the evidence that you observed and 
collected, is it your opinion that this was most likely an intentionally 
set fire or an act of arson? 
A. That would be my opinion. 
(See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 32,11. 21-25, p. 33,11. 1-9, R. 162.) 
Lastly, Mr. Nelson testified as follows: 
Q. So you have to sort of leave it open that it was an intentional fire? 
A. Well, we do that, but based on my experience in looking at these 
fires, this fire started on the outside of the house. There was no 
accidental way for it to have started. So I felt that the most likely 
possibility was a hand held flame or somebody wanting to either 
burn the house down or maybe they saw a pile of debris and just 
wanted to light it on fire . . . 
Q. Although you testified you don't know for sure the intent of the 
individual that you believe set the fire, you believe it's likely that 
the fire resulted from an act of arson with the intent to cause 
destruction? 
A. That's my opinion, yes. I believe it's an intentionally set fire. 
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(See Rex Nelson Deposition, p. 36,11. 9-19, p. 37,11. 18-24, R. 163-164.) 
Mr. Long testified as follows as to his opinion as to the cause of the fire: 
Q. I have a few questions. As a fire investigator, Jeff, can you determine 
the cause and origin in the fire without knowing the identity of the 
person who caused the fire? 
A. Sure. 
Q. And can you make a determination that a fire was the result of arson 
without knowing the identity of the person who set the fire? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you find any evidence that would indicate that this fire we are 
talking about here today was accidentally caused? 
A. I found no evidence that it was accidentally caused. I removed all 
accidental causes. 
(See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 32,11. 5-16, R. 173.) 
Mr. Long further testified as follows: 
Q. And then going back to my question, it's more likely than not that 
this was the result of arson? 
A. Yes. If I would-if it had been my fire working as a criminal investigator 
if I would have found the person who did it I would have screened 
the case with the district attorney for a charge of arson. 
Q. But even not knowing the identity of the person you can still make 
a determination more likely than not it was arson? 
A. Yes. 
(See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 35,11. 18-25, p. 36,11. 1-3, R. 176-177.) 
Lastly, Mr. Long testified as follows: 
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Q. I just have one more question. And just to be clear, can you look 
at paragraph 12 of your affidavit, Jeff. 
A. Paragraph 12, yes. 
Q. It reads, it is my opinion that the fire resulted from an act of arson with 
the wilful intent to cause damage to the home. Is that statement 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
(See Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 178.) 
Contrary to the Williams' assertions, Mr. Long did not repudiate paragraph 12 of his 
Affidavit; rather, he affirmed it. He testified that although he does not know the exact intent 
of the unknown arsonist, it is his opinion that the fire resulted from an act of arson. (See 
Jeffrey Long Deposition, p. 42,11. 3-11, R. 178.) 
Again, this evidence was uncontroverted at the trial level. Moreover, this Court has 
held that intent may be inferred from the nature of the act and the accompanying reasonable 
foreseeability of harm. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
State Farm & Cas. Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). An effect which is the 
natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not an accident; whether 
an intentional act leading to unintended harm is considered accidental or not generally 
depends on the likelihood that the intentional act will result in harm of the type that in fact 
occurred. Id. 
In this case, the natural and probable consequence of the unknown arsonist's act of 
igniting the fire at the base of the door where debris was piled up was that it would destroy 
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or cause significant damage to the Williams' property. The inferred intent of the unknown 
arsonist(s) is that he/she intended to cause damage to the Williams' property. If there was 
another explanation, Williams could have presented such evidence at the trial level. They 
did not. 
CONCLUSION 
Bear River requests that this Court affirm the trial court's summary judgment order, 
which states that there is no coverage for the damages to the Williams' property located at 
1163 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, because the damage resulted from an act of 
vandalism and malicious mischief 
(arson) while the property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days. 
DATED this / £ day of January, 2006. 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
LOWELL V. SMITH 
JUSTIN E. SCOTT 
Attorneys for Appellee Bear River 
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE BEAR 
RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY was mailed, postage prepaid, this Uj^ day 
of January, 2006 to: 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson Turner Fairbanks & Dalby, L.C. 
1218 W. South Jordan Pkwy, #B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
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25 
Tab A 
FILED iltol ftiftr tiOURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 S 2005 r\ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY / " V 
LOWELL V.SMITH, #3006 * — _ ^ 
JUSTINE. SCOTT, #9162 ~~~o^ma^r 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
7351 S. Union Park Ave., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 562-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
V . j 
DAVID WILLIAMS and DEANNA ] 
WILLIAMS, ] 
Defendants. ] 
l ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
) PLAINTIFF, BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
) INSURANCE COMPANY 
i AND 
I ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
I MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030923716 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and Defendants, David Williams 
and Deanna Williams, filed Motions for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. These motions came before the Honorable L. A. Dever for oral 
argument on May 31, 2005. Plaintiff was represented by Justin Scott, Smith & Glauser, 
P.C. Defendants were represented by Shawn Turner, Larson, Turner, Fairbanks & Dalby, 
P.C. 
The Court, having reviewed the motions for summary judgment and supporting 
memoranda, having considered oral argument presented in support of and in opposition 
to the motions for summary judgment, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby, 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The policy issued 
by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company specifically excludes coverage for damages 
caused by vandalism and malicious mischief when the property has been vacant for more 
than 30 consecutive days. Arson is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief, consistent 
with the exclusion contained in the policy. There is no coverage for the damages to the 
defendant insureds' property located at 1163 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which resulted from an act of vandalism and malicious mischief on July 3, 2003 when the 
property had been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days. 
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
DATED this H day of June, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
THE»HOrWiRApc§JUA. DEVER 
Third D\st(\&Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this 5 ; ^ day of May, 2005 to: 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson Turner Fairbanks & Dalby, L.C. 
1218 W. South Jordan Pkwy, #B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
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MURRAY, UTAH 
DWELLING FIRE INSURANCE DECLARATION PAGE 
This Declaration Page and the non-assessable dwelling policy provisions are the contractual obligations assumed by the Insured 
and Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, Murray, Utah. 
NAMED INSURED 
WILLIAiMS, DAVID AND DEANNA 
PO BOX 25670 
HONOLULU, HI 96825 
MAILING ADDRESS 
WILLIAMS, DAVID AND DEANNA 
PO BOX 25670 
HONOLULU, HI 96825 
Print Date 01/06/2003 
Policy Number Fl78238 
Agent Info 
Agent No. 85 Sub-Agent 
MONSON INSURANCE 
635 W 5300 SSTE 201 
MURRAY UT 84123 
801-269-1999 
Renewal Declaration 
Policy Term: 12:01 a.m. MST at Location of Property Described 
Yr. of Const. 1945 
Type of Const. Frame 
Prot. Class 3 
Number of Units 
From: 03/05/2003 To: 03/05/2004 
Insured Property Location 
1163 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
On each dwelling the insurance is afforded only with respect to the dwelling as indicated and by a specific premium charge or charges. 
The limits of the Company's liability against each such coverage or peril insured against shall be stated herein for which a premium is 
charged subject to the provisions of the policy and endorsements added thereto. Insurance is provided only with respect to the following 
coverages for which a limit of liability is specified, subject to all conditions of this policy. 
Coverages 
Dwelling 
Contents 
Liability (DLC) 
Limits of Liability 
50,000 
300,000 / 1,000 MED 
Total Premium 
Premium 
94.00 
0.00 
55.00 
149.00 J 
Form and Endorsement made part of this Policy at time 
of issue. ISO Form Number(s) 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS - UTAH 
DP3,DLC, 
DEDUCTIBLE — All Coverage and Endorsements are subject to a 250 deductible. 
Mortgagee (s) as their interest may appear. Premium Payable By Mortgagee [No 
Dwelling Property 3 
Special Form 
Ed. 7-88 
AGREEMENT 
We will provide the insurance described in this policy in return for the premium and compliance with all applicable 
provisions of this policy. 
DEFINITIONS 
In this policy, "you" and "your" refer to the "named insured" shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident 
of the same household. "We," "us" and "our" refer to the Company providing this insurance. 
COVERAGES 
This insurance applies to the Described Location, 
Coverages for which a Limit of Liability is shown and 
Perils Insured Against for which a Premium is stated. 
COVERAGE A - Dwelling 
We cover: 
1. the dwelling on the Described Location shown in 
the Declarations, used principally for dwelling pur-
poses, including structures attached to the dwell-
ing; 
2. materials and supplies located on or next to the 
Described Location used to construct, alter or re-
pair the dwelling or other structures on the De-
scribed Location; and 
3. if not otherwise covered in this policy, building 
equipment and outdoor equipment used for the 
service of and located on the Described Location. 
This coverage does not apply to land, including land 
on which the dwelling is located. 
COVERAGE B - Other Structures 
We cover other structures on the Described Location, 
set apart from the dwelling by clear space. This in-
cludes structures connected to the dwelling by only a 
fence, utility line, or similar connection. 
This coverage does not apply to land, including land 
on which the other structures are located. 
We do not cover other structures: 
1. used in whole or in part for commercial, manufac-
turing or farming purposes; or 
2. rented or held for rental to any person not a tenant 
of the dwelling, unless used solely as a private ga-
rage. 
COVERAGE C - Personal Property 
We cover personal property, usual to the occupancy 
as a dwelling and owned or used by you or members 
of your family residing with you while it is on the De-
scribed Location. At your request, we will cover per-
sonal property owned by a guest or servant while the 
property is on the Described Location. 
Property Not Covered. We do not cover: 
1. accounts, bank notes, bills, bullion, coins, cur-
rency, deeds, evidences of debt, gold other than 
goldware, letters of credit, manuscripts, medals, 
money, notes other than bank notes, passports, 
personal records, platinum, securities, silver other 
than silverware, tickets and stamps; 
2. animals, birds or fish; 
3. aircraft and parts. Aircraft means any contrivance 
used or designed for flight, except model or hobby 
aircraft not used or designed to carry people or 
cargo; 
4. motor vehicles or all other motorized land convey-
ances. This includes: 
a. their equipment and accessories; or 
b. any device or instrument for the transmitting, 
recording, receiving or reproduction of sound or 
pictures which is operated by power from the 
electrical system of motor vehicles or all other 
motorized land conveyances, including: 
(1) accessories or antennas; or 
(2) tapes, wires, records, discs or other media 
for use with any such device or instrument; 
while in or upon the vehicle or conveyance. 
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We do cover vehicles or conveyances not subject 
to motor vehicle registration which are: 
a. used to service the Described Location; or 
b. designed for assisting the handicapped; 
5. watercraft, other than rowboats and canoes; 
6. data, including data stored in: 
a. books of account, drawings or other paper 
records; or 
b. electronic data processing tapes, wires, re-
cords, discs or other software media. 
However, we do cover the cost of blank recording 
or storage media, and of pre-recorded computer 
programs available on the retail market; 
7. credit cards or fund transfer cards. 
If you remove personal property from the Described 
Location to a newly acquired principal residence, the 
Coverage C limit of liability will apply at each resi-
dence for the 30 days immediately after you begin to 
move the property there. This time period will not 
extend beyond the termination of this policy. Our liabil-
ity is limited to the proportion of the limit of liability that 
the value at each residence bears to the total value of 
all personal property covered by this policy. 
COVERAGE D - Fair Rental Value 
If a loss to property described in Coverage A, B or C 
by a Peril Insured Against under this policy makes that 
part of the Described Location rented to others or held 
for rental by you unfit for its normal use, we cover its: 
Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair rental value of 
that part of the Described Location rented to others 
or held for rental by you less any expenses that do 
not continue while that part of the Described Loca-
tion rented or held for rental is not fit to live in. 
Payment will be for the shortest time required to repair 
or replace that part of the Described Location rented 
or held for rental. 
If a civil authority prohibits you from use of the De-
scribed Location as a result of direct damage to a 
neighboring location by a Peril Insured Against in this 
policy, we cover the Fair Rental Value loss for no 
more than two weeks. 
The periods of time referenced above are not limited 
by the expiration of this policy. 
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation 
of a lease or agreement. 
COVERAGE E - Additional Living Expense 
If a loss to property described in Coverage A, B or C 
by a Peril Insured Against under this policy makes the 
Described Location unfit for its normal use, we cover 
your: 
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Additional Living Expense, meaning any neces-
sary increase in living expenses incurred by you so 
that your household can maintain its normal stan-
dard of living. 
Payment will be for the shortest time required to repair 
or replace the Described Location or, if you perma-
nently relocate, the shortest time required for your 
household to settle elsewhere. 
If a civil authority prohibits you from use of the De-
scribed Location as a result of direct damage to a 
neighboring location by a Peril Insured Against in this 
policy, we cover the Additional Living Expense loss for 
no more than two weeks. 
The periods of time referenced above are not limited 
by the expiration of this policy. 
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation 
of a lease or agreement. 
OTHER COVERAGES 
1. Other Structures. You may use up to 10% of the 
Coverage A limit of liability for loss by a Peril In-
sured Against to other structures described in 
Coverage B. 
Use of this coverage does not reduce the Cover-
age A limit of liability for the same loss. 
2. Debris Removal. We will pay your reasonable 
expense for the removal of: 
a. debris of covered property if a Peril Insured 
Against causes the loss; or 
b. ash, dust or particles from a volcanic eruption 
that has caused direct loss to a building or 
property contained in a building. 
Debris removal expense is included in the limit of 
liability applying to the damaged property. 
3. Improvements, Alterations and Additions. If you 
are a tenant of the Described Location, you may 
use up to 10% of the Coverage C limit of liability 
for loss by a Peril Insured Against to improve-
ments, alterations and additions, made or acquired 
at your expense, to that part of the Described Lo-
cation used only by you. 
Use of this coverage does not reduce the Cover-
age C limit of liability for the same loss. 
4. World-Wide Coverage. You may use up to 10% 
of the Coverage C limit of liability for loss by a Peril 
Insured Against to property covered under Cover-
age C except rowboats and canoes, while any-
where in the world. 
Use of this coverage reduces the Coverage C limit 
of liability for the same loss. 
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5. Rental Value and Additional Living Expense. 
You may use up to 10% of the Coverage A limit of 
liability for loss of both fair rental value as de-
scribed in Coverage D and additional living ex-
pense as described in Coverage E. 
Use of this coverage does not reduce the Cover-
age A limit of liability for the same loss. 
6. Reasonable Repairs. In the event that covered 
property is damaged by an applicable Peril Insured 
Against, we will pay the reasonable cost incurred 
by you for necessary measures taken solely to pro-
tect against further damage. If the measures taken 
involve repair to other damaged property, we will 
pay for those measures only if that property is cov-
ered under this policy and the damage to that 
property is caused by an applicable Peril Insured 
Against. 
This coverage: 
a. does not increase the limit of liability that ap-
plies to the covered property; 
b. does not relieve you of your duties, in case of a 
loss to covered property, as set forth in Condi-
tion 4.b. 
7. Property Removed. We insure covered property 
against direct loss from any cause while being re-
moved from a premises endangered by a Peril In-
sured Against and for no more than 30 days while 
removed. 
This coverage does not change the limit of liability 
that applies to the property being removed. 
8. Trees, Shrubs and Other Plants. We cover trees, 
shrubs, plants or lawns, on the Described Location 
for loss caused by the following Perils Insured 
Against: Fire or lightning, Explosion, Riot or civil 
commotion, Aircraft, Vehicles not owned or oper-
ated by you or a resident of the Described Location 
or Vandalism or malicious mischief, including 
damage during a burglary or attempted burglar;/, 
but not theft of property. 
The limit of liability for this coverage will not be 
more than 5% of the Coverage A limit of liability, or 
more than $500 for any one tree, shrub or plant. 
We do not cover property grown for commercial 
purposes. 
This coverage is additional insurance. 
9. Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay up 
to $500 for your liability assumed by contract or 
agreement for fire department charges incurred 
when the fire department is called to save or pro-
tect covered property from a Peril Insured Against. 
We do not cover fire department service charges if 
the property is located within the limits of the city, 
municipality or protection district furnishing the fire 
department response. 
This coverage is additional insurance. No deducti-
ble applies to this coverage. 
10. Collapse. We insure for risk of direct physical loss 
to covered property involving collapse of a building 
or any part of a building caused only by one or 
more of the following: 
a. Perils Insured Against in Coverage C - Per-
sonal Property. These perils apply to covered 
building and personal property for loss insured 
by this Other Coverage; 
b. hidden decay; 
c. hidden insect or vermin damage; 
d. weight of contents, equipment, animals or 
people; 
e. weight of rain which collects on a roof; 
f. use of defective material or methods in con-
struction, remodeling or renovation if the col-
lapse occurs during the course of the construc-
tion, remodeling or renovation. 
Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement, swim-
ming pool, underground pipe, flue, drain, cesspool, 
septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, 
pier, wharf or dock is not included under items b, c, 
d, e and f unless the loss is a direct result of the 
collapse of a building. 
Collapse does not include settling, cracking, 
shrinking, bulging or expansion. 
This coverage does not increase the limit of liability 
applying to the damaged covered property. 
11. Glass or Safety Glazing Material. We cover: 
a. the breakage of glass or safety glazing material 
which is part of a covered building, storm door 
or storm window; and 
b. damage to covered property by glass or safety 
glazing material which is part of a building, 
storm door or storm window. 
This coverage does not include loss on the De-
scribed Location if the dwelling has been vacant 
for more than 30 consecutive days immediately 
before the loss. A dwelling being constructed is 
not considered vacant. 
Loss for damage to glass will be settled on the ba-
sis of replacement with safety glazing materials 
when required by ordinance or law. 
This coverage does not increase the limit of liability 
that applies to the damaged property. 
w 
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PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
COVERAGE A - DWELLING and 
COVERAGE B - OTHER STRUCTURES 
We insure against risk of direct loss to property de-
scribed in Coverages A and B only if that loss is a 
physical loss to property; however, we do not insure 
loss: 
1. involving collapse, other than as provided in Other 
Coverages 10; 
2. caused by: 
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning 
or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or 
of a household appliance, or by discharge, 
leakage or overflow from within the system or 
appliance caused by freezing. This exclusion 
applies only while the dwelling is vacant, unoc-
cupied or being constructed unless you have 
used reasonable care to: 
(1) maintain heat in the building; or 
(2) shut off the water supply and drain the 
system and appliances of water; 
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of water 
or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to a: 
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming pool; 
(2) foundation, retaining wall or bulkhead; or 
(3) pier, wharf or dock; 
c. theft of property not part of a covered building 
or structure; 
d. theft in or to a dwelling or structure under con-
struction; 
e. wind, hail, ice, snow or sleet to: 
(1) outdoor radio and television antennas and 
aerials including their lead-in wiring, masts 
or towers; or 
(2) trees, shrubs, plants or lawns; 
f. vandalism and malicious mischief, theft or 
attempted theft if the dwelling has been vacant 
for more than 30 consecutive days immediately 
before the loss. A dwelling being constructed is 
not considered vacant; 
g. constant or repeated seepage or leakage of 
water or steam over a period of weeks, months 
or years from within a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning or automatic fire protective sprin-
kler system or from within a household appli-
ance; 
h. (1) wear and tear, marring, deterioration; 
(2) inherent vice, latent defect, mechanical 
breakdown; 
(3) smog, rust or other corrosion, mold, wet or 
dry rot; 
(4) smoke from agricultural smudging or indus-
trial operations; 
(5) discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration 
release or escape of pollutants. 
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous 
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including 
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals and waste. Waste includes ma-
terials to be recycled, reconditioned or re-
claimed; 
(6) settling, shrinking, bulging or expansion, 
including resultant cracking, of pavements, 
patios, foundations, walls, floors, roofs or 
ceilings; or 
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or domestic 
animals. 
If any of these cause water damage not other-
wise excluded, from a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning or automatic fire protective sprin-
kler system or household appliance, we cover 
loss caused by the water including the cost of 
tearing out and replacing any part of a building 
necessary to repair the system or appliance. 
We do not cover loss to the system or appli-
ance from which this water escaped. 
3. excluded under General Exclusions. 
Under items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss to property 
described in Coverages A and B not excluded or 
excepted in this policy is covered. 
COVERAGE C - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We insure for direct physical loss to the property de-
scribed in Coverage C caused by a peril listed below 
unless the loss is excluded in the General Exclusions. 
1. Fire or lightning. 
2. Windstorm or hail. 
This peril does not include loss to: 
a. property contained in a building caused by rain, 
snow, sleet, sand or dust unless the direct 
force of wind or hail damages the building 
causing an opening in a roof or wall and the 
rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through 
this opening; 
b. canoes and rowboats; or 
c. trees, shrubs or plants. 
3. Explosion. 
4. Riot or civil commotion. 
5. Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and 
spacecraft. 
6. Vehicles. 
u 
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7. Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental damage 
from smoke. 
This peril does not include loss caused by smoke 
from agricultural smudging or industrial operations. 
8. Vandalism or malicious mischief. 
This peril does not include loss by pilferage, theft, 
burglary or larceny. 
9. Damage by Burglars, meaning damage to cov-
ered property caused by Burglars. 
This peril does not include: 
a. theft of property; or 
b. damage caused by burglars to property on the 
Described Location if the dwelling has been va-
cant for more than 30 consecutive days imme-
diately before the damage occurs. A dwelling 
being constructed is not considered vacant. 
10. Falling Objects. 
This peril does not include loss to property con-
tained in the building unless the roof or an outside 
wall of the building is first damaged by a falling ob-
ject 
Damage to the falling object itself is not covered. 
11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes dam-
age to property contained in the building. 
12.Accidental discharge or overflow of water or 
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air condi-
tioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system 
or from within a household appliance. 
This peril does not include loss: 
a. to the system or appliance from which the 
water or steam escaped; 
b. caused by or resulting from freezing except as 
provided in the peril of freezing below; or 
c. on the Described Location caused by acciden-
tal discharge or overflow which occurs off the 
Described Location. 
In this peril, a plumbing system does not include a 
sump, sump pump or related equipment. 
13. Sudden and accidental tearing apart, cracking, 
burning or bulging of a steam or hot water heat-
ing system, an air conditioning or automatic fire 
protective sprinkler system, or an appliance for 
heating water. 
This peril does not include loss caused by or re-
sulting from freezing except as provided in the peril 
of freezing below. 
14.Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning 
or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or of a 
household appliance. 
This peril does not include loss on the Described 
Location while the dwelling is unoccupied or being 
constructed, unless you have used reasonable 
care to: 
a. maintain heat in the building; or 
b. shut off the water supply and drain the system 
and appliances of water. 
15. Sudden and accidental damage from artificially 
generated electrical current. 
This peril does not include loss to a tube, transistor 
or similar electronic component. 
16.Volcanic Eruption other than loss caused by 
earthquake, land shock waves or tremors. 
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS 
1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indi-
rectly by any of the following. Such loss is ex-
cluded regardless of any other cause or event con-
tributing concurrently or in any sequence to the 
loss. 
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of 
any ordinance or law regulating the use, con-
struction, repair, or demolition of a building or 
other structure, unless specifically provided un-
der this policy. 
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake includ-
ing land shock waves or tremors before, during 
or after a volcanic eruption; landslide; mine 
subsidence; mudflow; earth sinking, rising or 
shifting; unless direct loss by: 
(1) fire; 
(2) explosion; or 
(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing material 
which is part of a building, storm door or 
storm window; 
ensues and then we will pay only for the ensu-
ing loss. 
c. Water Damage, meaning: 
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, 
overflow of a body of water, or spray from 
any of these, whether or not driven by wind; 
(2) water which backs up through sewers or 
drains or which overflows from a sump; or 
(3) water below the surface of the ground, 
including water which exerts pressure on or 
seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, 
driveway, foundation, swimming pool or 
other structure. ft 
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Direct loss by fire or explosion resulting from 
water damage is covered. 
d. Power Failure, meaning the failure of power or 
other utility service if the failure takes place off 
the Described Location. But, if a Peril insured 
Against ensues on the Described Location, we 
will pay only for that ensuing loss. 
e. Neglect, meaning your neglect to use all rea-
sonable means to save and preserve property 
at and after the time of a loss. 
f. War, including undeclared war, civil war, insur-
rection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a 
military force or military personnel, destruction 
or seizure or use for a military purpose, and in-
cluding any consequence of any of these. Dis-
charge of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a 
warlike act even if accidental. 
g. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth in the 
Nuclear Hazard Clause of the Conditions. 
h. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out 
of any act committed: 
(1) by or at the direction of you or any person or 
organization named as an additional in-
sured; and 
(2) with the intent to cause a loss. 
2. We do not insure for loss to property described in 
Coverages A and B caused by any of the following. 
However, any ensuing loss to property described in 
Coverages A and B not excluded or excepted in 
this policy is covered. 
a. Weather conditions. However, this exclusion 
only applies if weather conditions contribute in 
any way with a cause or event excluded in 
paragraph 1. above to produce the loss; 
b. Acts or decisions, including the failure to act 
or decide, of any person, group, organization or 
governmental body; 
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective; 
(1) planning, zoning, development, surveying, 
siting; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, repair, 
construction, renovation, remodeling, grad-
ing, compaction; 
(3) materials used in repair, construction, reno-
vation or remodeling; or 
(4) maintenance; 
of part or all of any property whether on or off 
the Described Location. 
CONDITIONS 
1. Policy Period. This policy applies only to loss 
which occurs during the policy period. 
2. Insurable interest and Limit of Liability. Even if 
more than one person has an insurable interest in 
the property covered, we will not be liable in any 
one loss: 
a. for an amount greater than the interest of a 
person insured under this policy; or 
b. for more than the applicable limit of liability. 
3. Concealment or Fraud. The entire policy will be 
void if, whether before or after a loss, you have: 
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented any 
material fact or circumstance; 
b. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 
c. made false statements; 
relating to this insurance. 
4. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to cov-
ered property, you must see that the following are 
done: 
a. give prompt notice to us or our agent; 
b. (1) protect the property from further damage; 
(2) make reasonable and necessary repairs to 
protect the property; and 
(3) keep an accurate record of repair ex-
penses; 
c. prepare an inventory of damaged personal 
property showing the quantity, description, ac-
tual cash value and amount of loss. Attach all 
bills, receipts and related documents that justify 
the figures in the inventory; 
d. as often as we reasonably require: 
(1) show the damaged property; 
(2) provide us with records and documents we 
request and permit us to make copies; and 
(3) submit to examination under oath, while not 
in the presence of any other named insured, 
and sign the same; 
e. send to us, within 60 days after our request, 
your signed, sworn proof of loss which sets 
forth, to the best of your knowledge and belief: 
(1) the time and cause of loss; 
(2) your interest and that of all others in the 
property involved and all liens on the prop-
erty; 
(3) other insurance which may cover the loss; 
(4) changes in title or occupancy of the property 
during the term of the policy; 
\H 
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(5) specifications of damaged buildings and 
detailed repair estimates; 
(6) the inventory of damaged personal property 
described in 4c; 
(7) receipts for additional living expenses in-
curred and records that support the fair 
rental value loss. 
5. Loss Settlement. Covered property losses are 
settled as follows: 
a. (1) Personal property; 
(2) Awnings, carpeting, household appliances, 
outdoor antennas and outdoor equipment, 
whether or not attached to buildings; and 
(3) Structures that are not buildings; 
at actual cash value at the time of loss but not 
more than the amount required to repair or re-
place. 
b. Buildings under Coverage A or B at replace-
ment cost without deduction for depreciation, 
subject to the following: 
(1) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insur-
ance in this policy on the damaged building 
is 80% or more of the full replacement cost 
of the building immediately before the loss, 
we will pay the cost to repair or replace, af-
ter application of deductible and without de-
duction for depreciation, but not more than 
the least of the following amounts: 
* (a) the limit of liability under this policy that 
applies to the building; 
(b) the replacement cost of that part of the 
building damaged for like construction 
and use on the same premises; or 
(c) the necessary amount actually spent to 
repair or replace the damaged building. 
(2) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insur-
ance in this policy on the damaged building 
is less than 80% of the full replacement cost 
of the building immediately before the loss, 
we will pay the greater of the following 
amounts, but not more than the limit of li-
ability under this policy that applies to the 
building: 
(a) the actual cash value of that part of the 
building damaged; or 
(b) that proportion of the cost to repair or 
replace, after application of deductible 
and without deduction for depreciation, 
that part of the building damaged, which 
the total amount of insurance in this pol-
icy on the damaged building bears to 
80% of the replacement cost of the 
building. 
(3) To determine the amount of insurance 
required to equal 80% of the full replace-
ment cost of the building immediately before 
the loss, do not include the value of: 
(a) excavations, foundations, piers or any 
supports which are below the undersur-
face of the lowest basement floor; 
(b) those supports in (a) above which are 
below the surface of the ground ins;ide 
the foundation walls, if there is no 
basement; and 
(c) underground flues, pipes, wiring and 
drains. 
(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash 
value of the damage unless: 
(a) actual repair or replacement is com-
plete; or 
(b) the cost to repair or replace the damage 
is both: 
(i) less than 5% of the amount of insur-
ance in this policy on the building; 
and 
(ii) less than $2500. 
(5) You may disregard the replacement cost 
loss settlement provisions and make claim 
under this policy for loss or damage to 
buildings on an actual cash value basis. 
You may then make claim within 180 days 
after loss for any additional liability on a re-
placement cost basis. 
6. Loss to a Pair or Set. In case of loss to a pair or 
set we may elect to: 
a. repair or replace any part to restore the pair or 
set to its value before the loss; or 
b. pay the difference between actual cash value of 
the property before and after the loss. 
7. Glass Replacement. Loss for damage to glass 
caused by a Peril Insured Against will be settled on 
the basis of replacement with safety glazing mate-
rials when required by ordinance or law. 
8. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the 
amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal of 
the loss. In this event, each party will choose a 
competent appraiser within 20 days after receiving 
a written request from the other. The two apprais-
ers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree 
upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we may re-
quest that the choice be made by a judge of a 
court of record in the state where the Described 
Location is located. The appraisers will separately 
set the amount of loss. If the appraisers submit a 
written report of an agreement to us, the amount 
agreed upon will be the amount of loss. If they fail 
to agree, they will submit their differences to the 
umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will set 
the amount of loss. 
DP 00 03 07 88 Coovriaht Insurance Services Dffir.p \nr. 1QRR 1QQ9 P a n o 7 n f Q 
Each party will: 
a. pay its own appraiser; and 
b. bear the other expenses of the appraisal and 
umpire equally. 
9. Other Insurance. If property covered by this policy 
is also covered by other fire insurance, we will pay 
only the proportion of a loss caused by any peril 
insured against under this policy that the limit of li-
ability applying under this policy bears to the total 
amount of fire insurance covering the property. 
10.Subrogation. You may waive in writing before a 
loss all rights of recovery against any person. If not 
waived, we may require an assignment of rights of 
recovery for a loss to the extent that payment is 
made by us. 
If an assignment is sought, the person insured 
must sign and deliver all related papers and coop-
erate with us. 
11.Suit Against Us. No action can be brought unless 
the policy provisions have been complied with and 
the action is started within one year after the date 
of loss. 
12.0ur Option. If we give you written notice within 30 
days after we receive your signed, sworn proof of 
loss, we may repair or replace any part of the 
damaged property with like property. 
13. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with you. 
We will pay you unless some other person is 
named in the policy or is legally entitled to receive 
payment. Loss will be payable 60 days after we re-
ceive your proof of loss and: 
a. reach an agreement with you; 
b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or 
c. there is a filing of an appraisal award with us. 
14. Abandonment of Property. We need not accept 
any property abandoned by you. 
15. Mortgage Clause. 
The word "mortgagee" includes trustee. 
If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss 
payable under Coverage A or B will be paid to the 
mortgagee and you, as interests appear. If more 
than one mortgagee is named, the order of pay-
ment will be the same as the order of precedence 
of the mortgages. 
If we deny your claim, that denial will not apply to a 
valid claim of the mortgagee, if the mortgagee: 
a. notifies us of any change in ownership, occu-
pancy or substantial change in risk of which the 
mortgagee is aware; 
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b. pays any premium due under this policy on 
demand if you have neglected to pay the pre-
mium; and 
c. submits a signed, sworn statement of loss 
within 60 days after receiving notice from us of 
your failure to do so. Policy conditions relating 
to Appraisal, Suit Against Us and Loss Pay-
ment apply to the mortgagee. 
If we decide to cancel or not to renew this policy, 
the mortgagee will be notified at least 10 days be-
fore the date cancellation or nonrenewal takes ef-
fect. 
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny 
payment to you: 
a. we are subrogated to all the rights of the mort-
gagee granted under the mortgage on the 
property; or 
b. at our option, we may pay to the mortgagee the 
whole principal on the mortgage plus any ac-
crued interest. In this event, we will receive a 
full assignment and transfer of the mortgage 
and all securities held as collateral to the mort-
gage debt. 
Subrogation will not impair the right of the mort-
gagee to recover the full amount of the mort-
gagee's claim. 
16. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any 
assignment or grant any coverage that benefits a 
person or organization holding, storing or moving 
property for a fee regardless of any other provision 
of this policy. 
17. Cancellation. 
a. You may cancel this policy at any time by re-
turning it to us or by letting us know in writing of 
the date cancellation is to take effect. 
b. We may cancel this policy only for the reasons 
stated below by letting you know in writing of 
the date cancellation takes effect. This cancel-
lation notice may be delivered to you, or mailed 
to you at your mailing address shown in the 
Declarations. 
Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of no-
tice. 
(1) When you have not paid the premium, we 
may cancel at any time by letting you know 
at least 10 days before the date cancellation 
takes effect 
(2) When this policy has been in effect for less 
than 60 days and is not a renewal with us, 
we may cancel for any reason by letting you 
know at least 10 days before the date can-
cellation takes effect. 
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(3) When this policy has been in effect for 60 
days or more, or at any time if it is a renewal 
with us, we may cancel: 
(a) if there has been a material misrepre-
sentation of fact which if known to us 
would have caused us not to issue the 
policy; or 
(b) if the risk has changed substantially 
since the policy was issued. 
This can be done by letting you know at 
least 30 days before the date cancellation 
takes effect. 
(4) When this policy is written for a period of 
more than one year, we may cancel for any 
reason at anniversary by letting you know at 
least 30 days before the date cancellation 
takes effect. 
c. When this policy is cancelled, the premium for 
the period from the date of cancellation to the 
expiration date will be refunded pro rata. 
d. If the return premium is not refunded with the 
notice of cancellation or when this policy is re-
turned to us, we will refund it within a reason-
able time after the date cancellation takes ef-
fect. 
18. Non-Renewal. We may elect not to renew this 
policy. We may do so by delivering to you, or mail-
ing to you at your mailing address shown in the 
Declarations, written notice at least 30 days before 
the expiration date of this policy. Proof of mailing 
will be sufficient proof of notice. 
19. Liberalization Clause. If we make a change 
which broadens coverage under this edition of our 
policy without additional premium charge, that 
change will automatically apply to your insurance 
as of the date we implement the change in your 
state, provided that this implementation date falls 
within 60 days prior to or during the policy period 
stated in the Declarations. 
This Liberalization Clause does not apply to 
changes implemented through introduction of a 
subsequent edition of our policy. 
20.Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A 
waiver or change of a provision of this policy must 
be in writing by us to be valid. Our request for an 
appraisal or examination will not waive any of our 
rights. 
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21. Assignment. Assignment of this policy will not be 
valid unless we give our written consent. 
22. Death. If you die, we insure: 
a. your legal representatives but only with respect 
to the property of the deceased covered under 
the policy at the time of death; 
b. with respect to your property, the person having 
proper temporary custody of the property until 
appointment and qualification of a legal repre-
sentative. 
23. Nuclear Hazard Clause. 
a. "Nuclear Hazard" means any nuclear reaction, 
radiation or radioactive contamination, all 
whether controlled or uncontrolled or however 
caused, or any consequence of any of these. 
b. Loss caused by the nuclear hazard will not be 
considered loss caused by fire, explosion, or 
smoke, whether these perils are specifically 
named in or otherwise included within the Perils 
Insured Against. 
c. This policy does not apply to loss caused di-
rectly or indirectly by nuclear hazard, except 
that direct loss by fire resulting from the nuclear 
hazard is covered. 
24.Recovered Property. If you or we recover any 
property for which we have made payment under 
this policy, you or we will notify the other of the re-
covery. At your option, the property will be returned 
to or retained by you or it will become our property. 
If the recovered property is returned to or retained 
by you, the loss payment will be adjusted based on 
the amount you received for the recovered prop-
erty. 
25. Volcanic Eruption Period. One or more volcanic 
eruptions that occur within a 72-hour period will be 
considered as one volcanic eruption. 
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DWELLING PROPERTY 
DP 01 43 04 98 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS - UTAH 
OTHER COVERAGES 
10. In Forms DP 00 02 and DP 00 03, Collapse is 
deleted and replaced by the following: 
10. Collapse 
a. With respect to this Other Coverage: 
(1) Collapse means an abrupt falling down or 
caving in of a building or any part of a build-
ing with the result that the building or part of 
the building cannot be occupied for its in-
tended purpose. 
(2) A building or any part of a building that is in 
danger of falling down or caving in is not 
considered to be in a state of collapse. 
(3) A part of a building that is standing is not 
considered to be in a state of collapse even 
if it has separated from another part of the 
building. 
(4) A building that is standing or any part of a 
building that is standing is not considered to 
be in a state of collapse even if it shows 
evidence of cracking, bulging, sagging, 
bending, leaning, settling, shrinkage or ex-
pansion. 
b. We insure for direct physical loss to covered 
property involving collapse of a building or any 
part of a building if the collapse was caused by 
one or more of the following: 
(1) Perils Insured Against in Coverage C -
Personal Property. These perils apply to 
covered building and personal property for 
loss insured by this Other Coverage; 
(2) Decay that is hidden from view, unless the 
presence of such decay is known to you 
prior to collapse; 
(3) Insect or vermin damage that is hidden from 
view, unless the presence of such damage 
is known to you prior to collapse; 
(4) Weight of contents, equipment, animals or 
people; 
(5) Weight of rain which collects on a roof; or 
(6) Use of defective material or methods in 
construction, remodeling or renovation if the 
collapse occurs during the course of the 
construction, remodeling or renovation. 
Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement, 
swimming pool, underground pipe, flue, 
drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, re-
taining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf or dock is 
not included under Items (2), (3), (4), (5), 
and (6) unless the loss is a direct result of 
the collapse of a building or any part of a 
building. 
This coverage does not increase the limit of liability 
applying to the damaged covered property. 
11. In Forms DP 00 02 and DP 00 03, Glass or 
Safety Glazing Material is deleted and replaced 
by the following: 
11. Glass Or Safety Glazing Material 
a. We cover: 
(1) The breakage of glass or safety glazing 
material which is part of a covered building, 
storm door or storm window; 
(2) The breakage, caused directly by Earth 
Movement, of glass or safety glazing mate-
rial which is part of a covered building, 
storm door or storm window; and 
(3) The direct physical loss to covered property 
caused solely by the pieces, fragments or 
splinters of broken glass or safety glazing 
material which is part of a building, storm 
door or storm window. 
b. This coverage does not include loss: 
(1) To covered property which results because 
the glass or safety glazing material has 
been broken, except as provided in a.(3) 
above; or 
(2) On the Described Location if the dwelling 
has been vacant for more than 30 consecu-
tive days immediately before the loss, ex-
cept when the breakage results directly 
from Earth Movement as provided for in 
a.(2) above. A dwelling being constructed is 
not considered vacant. 
Loss to glass covered under this Other Coverage 
11. will be settled on the basis of replacement with 
safety glazing materials when required by Ordi-
nance or Law. 
This coverage does not increase the Limit of Liabil-
ity that applies to the damaged property. 
\? 
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The following Other Coverage is added to all forms 
except DP 00 01. When you are a tenant of a De-
scribed Location covered under this policy, the words 
'covered building' used below, refer to property at 
such a Described Location covered under Other Cov-
erage 3. Improvements, Alterations And Additions. 
12. Ordinance Or Law 
a. The Ordinance Or Law Limit of Liability deter-
mined in b. or c. below will apply with respect to 
the increased costs you incur due to the en-
forcement of any ordinance or law which re-
quires or regulates: 
(1) The construction, demolition, remodeling, 
renovation or repair of that part of a covered 
building or other structure damaged by a 
Peril Insured Against; 
(2) The demolition and reconstruction of the 
undamaged part of a covered building or 
other structure, when that building or other 
structure must be totally demolished be-
cause of damage by a Peril Insured Against 
to another part of that covered building or 
other structure; or 
(3) The remodeling, removal or replacement of 
the portion of the undamaged part of a cov-
ered building or other structure necessary to 
complete the remodeling, repair or re-
placement of that part of the covered build-
ing or other structure damaged by a Peril 
Insured Against 
b. If you are an owner of a Described Location, 
and that location: 
(1) Is insured for Coverage A or Unit-Owners 
Building Items, you may use up to 10% of 
the Limit of Liability that applies to Coverage 
A or Unit-Owners Building Items at each 
Described Location; or 
(2) Is not insured for Coverage A or Unit-
Owners Building Items, you may use up to 
10% of the total Limit of Liability that applies 
to Coverage B at each Described Location. 
c. If you are a tenant of a Described Location, you 
may use up to 10% of the Limit of Liability that 
applies to Improvements, Alterations And Addi-
tions at each Described Location. 
d. You may use all or part of this ordinance or law 
coverage to pay for the increased costs you in-
cur to remove debris resulting from the con-
struction, demolition, remodeling, renovation, 
repair or replacement of property as stated in a. 
above. 
e. We do not cover: 
(1) The loss in value to any covered building or 
other structure due to the requirements of 
any ordinance or law; or 
(2) The costs to comply with any ordinance or 
law which requires you or others to test for, 
monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, 
detoxify or neutralize, or in any way respond 
to, or assess the effects of, pollutants on 
any covered building or other structure. 
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous 
or thermal irritant or contaminant, including 
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals and waste. Waste includes mate-
rials to be recycled, reconditioned or re-
claimed. 
This coverage is additional insurance. 
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS 
1. Ordinance or Law is deleted and replaced by the 
following: 
1. Ordinance Or Law, meaning any ordinance or law: 
a. Requiring or regulating the construction, demo-
lition, remodeling, renovation or repair of prop-
erty, including removal of any resulting debris. 
This Exclusion 1.a. in Form DP 00 02, A.1.a. in 
Form DP 00 01, and 1.a.(1) in Form DP 00 03, 
does not apply to the amount of coverage that 
may be provided under Other Coverages, 
Glass Or Safety Glazing Material or Ordinance 
Or Law; 
b. The requirements of which result in a loss in 
value to property; or 
c. Requiring you or others to test for, monitor, 
clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or 
neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess 
the effects of, pollutants. 
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or 
thermal irritant or contaminant, including 
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials 
to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 
This exclusion applies whether or not the property 
has been physically damaged. 
(This is Exclusion A.1. in Form DP 00 01 and Ex-
clusion 1.a. in Form DP 00 03.) 
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2. For all forms other than DP 00 01, Earth Move-
ment is deleted and replaced by the following: 
2. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake, including 
land shock waves or tremors before, during or af-
ter a volcanic eruption; landslide; mine subsidence; 
mudflow; earth sinking, rising or shifting; unless di-
rect loss by: 
a. Fire; or 
b. Explosion; 
ensues and then we will pay only for the ensuing 
loss. 
(This is Exclusion 1.b. in Form DP 00 03.) 
4. Power Failure is deleted and replaced by the 
following: 
4. Power Failure, meaning the failure of power or 
other utility service if the failure takes place off the 
Described Location. But if the failure of power or 
other utility service results in a loss, from a Peril 
Insured Against on the Described Location, we will 
pay for the loss or damage caused by that Peril In-
sured Against. 
(This is Exclusion 1.d. in Form DP 00 03.) 
CONDITIONS 
3. Concealment or Fraud is deleted and replaced by 
the following: 
3. Concealment Or Fraud 
With respect to all persons insured under this pol-
icy, we provide no coverage for loss if, whether be-
fore or after a loss, one or more persons insured 
under this policy have: 
a. Intentionally concealed or misrepresented any 
material fact or circumstance; 
b. Engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 
c. Made false statements; 
relating to this insurance. 
Under 4. Your Duties After Loss, Paragraph a. is 
deleted and replaced by the following: 
a. Give prompt notice to us or our agent. One 
means you may use to fulfill this requirement is 
mailing the notice to us, postage prepaid, 
through first class mail deposited in a United 
States Post Office; 
Under 4. Your Duties After Loss, the following is 
added to Item e.: 
One means you may use to send the requested 
proof of loss is mailing it to us, postage pre-
paid, through first class mail deposited in a 
United States Post Office. 
DP 01 43 04 98 Copyright, Insurance 
Failure to submit the requested proof of loss 
within 60 days does not invalidate your claim, if 
you show that it was not reasonably possible to 
^io so 3tt<i Bteo stow KteK v^u sufevrMted* ttv& 
proof of loss to us as soon as reasonably pos-
sible. 
11. Suit Against Us is deleted and replaced by the 
following: 
11. Suit Against Us 
No action can be brought unless the policy provi-
sions have been complied with and the action is 
started within three years after the date of loss. 
13. Loss Payment is deleted and replaced by the 
following: 
13. Loss Payment 
We will adjust all losses with you. We will pay you 
unless some other person is named in the policy or 
is legally entitled to receive payment. Loss will be 
payable within 30 days after we receive your proof 
of loss and: 
a. Reach an agreement with you; 
b. There is an entry of a final judgment; or 
c. There is a filing of an appraisal award with us. 
17. Cancellation 
Paragraph b. is deleted and replaced by the follow-
ing: 
b. We may cancel this policy only for the reasons 
stated below by letting you know in writing of 
the date cancellation takes effect. The 
cancellation notice may be delivered to you or 
mailed through first class mail to your last 
address known to us. 
Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of no-
tice. 
(1) When you have not paid the premium, we 
may cancel at any time by letting you know 
at least 10 days before the date cancellation 
takes effect. 
(2) When this policy has been in effect for less 
than 60 days and is not a renewal with us, 
we may cancel for any reason by letting you 
know at teast 10 days before the date can-
cellation takes effect 
(3) When this policy has been in effect for 60 
days or more, or at any time if it is a renewal 
with us, we may cancel if: 
(a) There has been a material misrepresen-
tation; 
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(b) The risk has changed substantially since 
the policy was issued, unless we could 
have reasonably foreseen the change or 
contemplated the risk in writing the pol-
icy; or 
(c) There has been a substantial breach of 
a contractual duty, condition or warranty. 
This can be done by letting you know at 
least 30 days before the date cancellation 
takes effect. 
(4) When this policy is written for a period of 
more than one year or for an indefinite term, 
we may cancel for any reason at anniver-
sary by letting you know at least 30 days be-
fore the date cancellation takes effect. 
18. Nonrenewal is deleted and replaced by the follow-
ing: 
18. Nonrenewal 
We may elect not to renew this policy. If we elect 
not to renew, we will let you know in writing at least 
30 days before the expiration date of the policy. 
The nonrenewal notice may be delivered to you or 
mailed through first class mail to your last address 
known to us. Proof of mailing will be sufficient 
proof of notice. 
All other provisions of this policy apply. 
}\ 
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DWELLING FIRE - UTAH 
PERSONAL DWELLING 
LIABILITY COVERAGE POLICY 
(DLC) 
778 E. Winchester Street (6600 South) 
PO Box 571310 
Murray, Utah 84157-0130 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in 
the State of Utah. Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that is provided. 
You may call the company to help and assist you in any questions you may have. 
The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company and by the 
insured named in the Declarations and Policy. 
BRM FORM S016 *DLC1 UA DOC* ED 2 03-01 
Replaces DLC1-3/92 
^ 
PERSONAL DWELLING LIABILITY AGEEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
We will provide the insurance described in this policy in return for the premium and in compliance with and according 
to the provisions of this policy and the declarations, including the limits of liability. 
DEFINITIONS 
In this policy, "you" and "your" r ^ e r t 0 the "named 
insured" shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a 
resident of the same household. "We", "us", and "our" 
refer to the Company providing this insurance. In 
addition, certain words and phrases are defined as 
follows: 
1 . "Bodily Injury" means bodily harm, sickness 
or disease, including required care, loss of 
services and death that results. 
2. "Business" means a trade, profession or 
occupation, including all farming, ranching, 
dairying and agricultural activities, whether full 
or part time, by one engaged in any 
commercial activity for gain or livelihood, 
including employees of their employer, 
executives and traveling salesmen. 
3. "Motor Vehicle," "auto" or "car" means a 
private passenger vehicle, pickup truck, panel 
truck or van, truck, tractor, motorcycle, or 
similar vehicle which is designed for use on 
public roads, including equipment, accessories 
and machinery. 
4. "Recreational Vehicle" means a self-
propelled land vehicle regardless of the 
method of surface conduct, including its trailer 
and all parts that are designed or used for 
leisure time activities. This includes, but does 
not exclude, all-terrain vehicles, motor homes 
or similar vehicles, whether or not they have 
four wheels or not. 
5. Insured" if shown on the declaration as: 
a. an "individual," insured means you, and 
residents of your household who are your 
relatives; and other persons under the age 
of 21 in the care of any person named 
above; 
6. 
b. a "partnership" or a "joint venture," insured 
means you, all partners and members and 
spouses, but only with respect to their 
liability as such; 
c. an "organization" (other than a 
"partnership" or a "joint venture)", insured 
means the organization and all of its 
executive officers, directors or 
stockholders, but only with respect to their 
liability as such; 
d. an organization or a person not including 
your employee or employees while acting 
as your real estate manager; 
e. your legal representative if you die while 
this policy is in force and effect and while 
your personal representative is acting 
within his/her legal duties and 
responsibilities but only with respect to the 
property as provided for under this policy 
under the definition of insured location. 
"Insured Location" means: 
a. the dwelling shown in the declarations and 
the premises on which the dwelling is 
located, and not to exceed four rental units 
located thereon; 
b. incidental other buildings and structures at 
the premises as shown in the Declarations 
at the "insured location;" 
c. individual or family cemetery plots or burial 
vaults of an "insured;" 
d. rights of way, easements and roadways for 
access to the "insured location." 
"Occurrence" means an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful 
conditions, which results, during the policy 
period, in: 
a. "bodily injury;" or 
b. "property damage." 
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8. "Property Damage" means physical injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of use of tangible 
property. 
9. "Limits of Liability" means the limit of liability 
that applies for the coverage. 
10. "Provisions or terms of this Policy" means 
all terms, limitations, exclusions, conditions 
and limits of liability and definitions of this 
coverage. 
11. "Declaration page" your personal dwelling 
liability coverage page is attached to the policy 
with your name, address, the "insured 
location", policy period, coverages and the 
amount of insurance based upon the premium 
paid, and your statements, representations 
and declarations. 
12. "Declarations" means the Declaration Page. 
LIABILITY COVERAGES 
Coverage L -
Bodily Injury or Property Damage 
We will pay for damages for bodily injury or property 
damage for which an "insured" becomes legally 
responsible caused by an "occurrence" arising out of 
the "insured location" or its incidental operation subject 
to the limits of liability. We will: 
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages 
for which the "insured" is legally liable. 
Damages include prejudgment interest 
awarded against the "insured;" 
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel 
of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, 
false or fraudulent. We may investigate and 
settle any claim or suit that we decide is 
appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends 
when the amount we pay for damages 
resulting from the "occurrence" equals our limit 
of liability. 
Coverage M - Medical Payments to Others 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that are 
incurred or medically ascertained within three years 
from the date of an accident causing "bodily injury," 
subject to the limits of liability as provided in the 
declarations and the provisions and terms of this 
policy. Medical expenses means reasonable charges 
for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance, 
hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices and 
funeral services. This coverage does not apply to you 
or regular residents of your household. As to others, 
this coverage applies only: 
1. to a person on the "insured location" with the 
permission of an "insured;" or 
2. to a person off the "insured location," if the 
"bodily injury:" 
a. arises out of a condition on the "insured 
location" or the ways immediately 
adjoining; 
b. is caused by the activities of an "insured" 
at the "insured location;" 
c. is caused by an animal owned by or in the 
care of an "insured" at the "insured 
location." 
Additional Coverages 
We cover the following in addition to the limits of 
liability: 
1. Claim Expenses. We pay: 
a. expenses we incur and costs taxed against 
an "insured" in any suit we defend; 
b. premiums on bonds required in a suit we 
defend, but not for bond amounts more 
than the limit or liability for Coverage L 
We need not apply for or furnish any bond; 
c. reasonable expenses incurred by an 
"insured" at our request, including actual 
loss of earnings (but not loss of other 
income) up to $35 per day, for assisting us 
in the investigation or defense of a claim or 
suit; 
d. interest on the entire judgement which 
accrues after entry of the judgement and 
before we pay or tender, or deposit in 
court that part of the judgement which 
does not exceed the limit of liability that 
applies. 
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2. First Aid Expenses. We will pay expenses for 
first aid to others incurred by an "insured" for 
"bodily injury" covered under this policy. We 
will not pay for first aid to you or any other 
"insured." 
3. Damage to Property of Others. We will pay, at 
replacement cost, up to $500 per "occurrence" 
for "property damage" to property of others 
caused by an "insured." 
We will not pay for "property damage:" 
a. caused intentionally by "insured" who is 13 
years of age or older; 
b. to property owned by an "insured;" 
c. to property owned by or rented to a tenant 
of an "insured" or a resident in your 
household; or 
d. arising out of: 
(1) a "business" engaged in by an 
"insured;" 
(2) any act or omission in connection with 
a premises owned, rented or 
controlled by an "insured," other than 
the "insured location;" or 
(3) the ownership, maintenance or use of 
aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicles or 
all other motorized land conveyances. 
EXCLUSIONS 
1 . Coverage L - Personal Liability, and Coverage 
M - Medical Payments to Others, do not apply 
to "bodily injury" or "property damage:" 
a. which is expected by, directed by, intended 
by or arises out of an act of force by an 
"insured." An act of force does not include 
the use of reasonable force to protect 
persons or property from an act of crime. 
b. arising out of or in connection with a 
"business" engaged in by an "insured" as 
defined in the definitions. This exclusion 
applies but is not limited to an act or 
omission, regardless of its nature or 
circumstance, involving a service or duty 
rendered, promised, owed or implied to be 
provided because of the nature of the 
"business;" 
c. arising out of the rendering of or failure to 
render professional services; 
d. arising out of a premises: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of motor vehicles 
or all other motorized land 
conveyances, including trailers, owned 
or operated by or rented or loaned to 
an "insured;" 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a 
motor vehicle or any other motorized 
land conveyance to any person; or; 
(3) vicarious liability, whether or not 
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a 
child or minor using a conveyance 
excluded in paragraph (1) or (2) 
above; 
e. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of a watercraft; 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a 
watercraft described below to any 
person; or 
(3) vicarious liability, whether or not 
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a 
child or minor using a watercraft. 
f. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use 
loading of an aircraft; 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of an 
aircraft to any person; or 
(3) vicarious liability, whether or not 
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a 
child or minor using a aircraft. 
An aircraft means any contrivance used or 
designed for flight, except model or hobby 
aircraft not used or designed to carry 
people or cargo. 
g. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use 
loading or unloading of recreational 
vehicles and all other recreational land 
or conveyances, including trailers 
owned, operated, rented or loaned to 
an "insured;" 
(2) the use of a recreational motor vehicle 
in, or in the practice or the preparation 
for, racing, speed, pulling or pushing, 
demolition or stunt activities or 
contests; or 
(3) the entrustment to Insured" o1 any 
motorized recreational vehicle, or any 
other motorized recreational land 
conveyance to any person; or 
(4) vicarious liability, whether or not 
statutorily imposed, for the actions of a 
child or minor using a recreational 
vehicle or conveyance excluded in 
paragraphs 1 and 2. 
h. caused directly or indirectly by war, 
including undeclared war, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike 
act by a military force or military personnel, 
destruction or seizure of use for a military 
purpose, and including any consequence 
of any of these. Discharge of a nuclear 
weapon will be deemed a warlike act even 
if accidental; 
i. which arises out of the transmission of a 
communicable disease by an "insured;" 
j . arising out of an "insured" who inflicts, or 
directs another person to inflict, upon any 
person, corporal punishment or sexual 
abuse which results in "bodily injury" or 
"property damage." Sexual abuse includes 
physical or mental harassment or assault 
of a sexual nature; 
k. arising out of the use, sale, manufacture, 
delivery, transfer or possession by any 
person of a Controlled Substance(s) as 
defined by the Federal Food and Drug Law 
at 21 U.S.CA Sections 811 and 812. 
Controlled Substances include but are not 
limited to, cocaine, LSD, marijuana and all 
narcotic drugs. However, this exclusion 
does not apply to the legitimate use of 
prescription drugs by a person following 
the orders of a licensed physician; 
I. arising out of the conduct of a partnership 
or a joint venture that is not shown on the 
declarations; 
m. arising out of work being performed by the 
"insured" or on the "insured's" behalf to 
change the use of the "insured location" to 
other than that of a residence; 
n. we do not pay for: 
(1) "bodily injury" to an employee of an 
"insured" if it occurs in the course of 
employment; 
(2) consequential injuries to a spouse, 
child, parent, brother or sister or such 
injured employee. 
(3) which is assumed under a contract or 
an agreement. This exclusion does 
not apply to an incidental contract. 
o. arising out of "bodily injury" to a person 
caused by lead poisoning. 
2. Coverage L - Personal Liability, does not 
apply to: 
a. liability: 
(1) for any loss assessment charged 
against you as a member of an 
association, corporation or community 
of property owners; 
b. "property damage" to property owned by 
the "insured;" 
c. "property damage" to property rented to, 
occupied or used by or in the care of the 
"insured;" 
d. "bodily injury" to any person eligible to 
receive any benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided; or 
(2) required to be provided; 
by the "insured" under any: 
(1) worker's compensation law; 
(2) non-occupational disability law; or 
(3) occupational disease law. 
e. "bodily injury" or "property damage" for 
which an "insured" under this policy: 
(1) is also an insured under a nuclear 
energy liability policy; or 
(2) would be an insured under that policy 
but for the exhaustion of its limit of 
liability. 
A nuclear energy liability policy is one 
issued by: 
(1) American Nuclear Insurers; 
(2) Mutual Atomic Energy Liability 
Underwriters; 
(3) Nuclear Insurance Assn. Of Canada; 
or any of their successors. 
f. "bodily injury" to you or an "insured" within 
the meaning of part a. or b. of "insured" as 
defined, 
3. Coverage M - Medical Payments to Others, 
does not apply to "bodily injury:" 
a. to a "residence employee;" 
b. to any person eligible to receive benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided; or 
(2) required to be provided: 
under any: 
(1) worker's compensation law; 
(2) non-occupational disability law; or 
(3) occupational disease law. 
c. from any: 
(1) nuclear reaction; 
(2) nuclear radiation; or 
(3) radioactive contamination; 
all whether controlled or uncontrolled or 
however caused by; or 
(4) any consequence of any of these. 
d. to any person, other than a "residence 
employee" of an "insured," regularly 
residing on any part of the "insured 
location." 
CONDITIONS 
1. Limit of Liability. Out total liability under 
Coverage L for all damages resulting from any 
one "occurrence" will not be more than the limit 
of liability for Coverage L as shown in the 
Declarations. This limit is the same regardless 
of the number of "insured's," claims made or 
persons injured. All "bodily injury" and 
"property damage" resulting from any one 
accident or from continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general 
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harmful conditions shall be considered to be 
the result of one "occurrence." 
Our total liability under Coverage M for all 
medical expense payable for "bodily injury" to 
one person as the result of one accident will 
not be more than the limit of liability for 
Coverage M as shown in the Declarations. 
2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance 
applies separately to each "insured." This 
condition will not increase our limit of liability 
for any one "occurrence." 
3. Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or 
"occurrence," the "insured" will perform the 
following duties that apply. You will help us by 
seeing that these duties are performed: 
a. give written notice to us or our agent as 
soon as is practical, which sets forth: 
(1) the identity of the policy and "insured;" 
(2) reasonably available information on 
the time, place and circumstances of 
the accident or "occurrence;" and 
(3) names and addresses of any 
claimants and witnesses; 
One means you may use to give written 
notice is mailing the notice to us, postage 
prepaid, through first class mail deposited 
in the United States Post Office. 
b. promptly forward to us every notice, 
demand, summons or other process 
relating to the accident or "occurrence;" 
c. at our request, help us; 
(1) to make settlement; 
(2) to enforce any right or contribution or 
indemnity against any person or 
organization who may be liable to an 
"insured;" 
(3) with the conduct of suits and attend 
hearings and trials; 
(4) to secure and give evidence and 
obtain the attendance of witnesses. 
d. under the coverage - Damage to Property 
of Others - submit to us within 60 days 
after the loss, a sworn statement of loss 
and show the damaged property, if in the 
"insured's" control. One means you may 
use to send the statement of loss is 
mailing it to us, postage prepaid, through 
first class mail deposited in the United 
States Post Office. Failure to submit the 
statement of loss within 60 days does not 
invalidate your claim, if you show that it 
was not reasonably possible to do so and 
also show that you submitted the 
statement to us as soon as reasonably 
possible; 
e. the "insured" will not, except at the 
"insured's" own cost, voluntarily make 
payment, assume obligation or incur 
expense other than for first aid to others at 
the time of the "bodily injury." 
4. Duties of an Injured Person - Coverage M -
Medical Payments to Others. The injured 
person or someone acting for the injured 
person will: 
a. give us written proof of claim, under oath if 
required, as soon as is practical; and 
b. authorize us to obtain copies of medical 
reports and records. 
The injured person will submit to physical 
examination by a doctor of our choice when 
and as often as we reasonably require. 
5. Payment of Claim - Coverage M - Medical 
Payments to Others. Payment under this 
coverage is not an admission of liability by an 
"insured" or us. 
6. Suit Against Us. No action can be brought 
unless the policy provisions have been 
compiled with and the action is started within 
three years after the date of the loss. 
No one will have the right to join us as a party 
to any action against an "insured." Also, no 
action With respect to Coverage L can be 
brought against us until the obligation of 
"insured" has been determined by final 
judgement or agreement signed by us. 
7. Bankruptcy of an "Insured". Bankruptcy or 
insolvency of an "insured" will not relieve* us of 
our obligations under this policy. 
8. Other Insurance - Coverage L - Personal 
Liability. This insurance is excess over other 
valid and collectible insurance except 
insurance written specifically to cover as 
excess over the limits of liability that apply in 
this policy. 
9. Policy Period. This policy applies only to 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" which 
occurs during the policy period. 
10. Subrogation. An "insured" may waive in 
writing before a loss all rights of recovery 
against any person, if not waived, we may 
require an assignment of rights of recovery for 
5n 
a loss to the extent that payment is made by 
us. 
If an assignment is sought, an "insured" must 
sign and deliver all related papers and 
cooperate with us. 
Subrogation does not apply to Medical 
Payments to Others or Damage to Property of 
Others. 
11. Concealment or Fraud. The entire policy will 
be void if, whether before or after a loss, an 
"insured" has: 
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented 
any material fact or circumstance; 
b. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 
c. made false statements; 
relating to this insurance. 
12. Liberalization Clause. If we make a change 
which broadens coverage under this edition of 
our policy without additional premium charge, 
that change will automatically apply to your 
insurance as of the date we implement the 
change in your state, provided that this 
implementation date falls within 60 days prior 
to or during the policy period stated in the 
Declarations. 
13. Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A 
waiver or change of a provision of this policy 
must be in writing by us to be valid. Our 
request for an appraisal or examination will not 
waive any of our rights. 
14. Assignment. Assignment of this policy will not 
be valid unless we give our written consent. 
15. Death. If any person named in the 
Declarations or the spouse, if a resident of the 
same household, dies: 
a. we insure the legal representative of the 
deceased but only with respect to the 
premises and property of the deceased 
covered under the policy at the time of 
death; 
b. "insured" includes: 
(1) any member of your household who is 
an "insured" at the time of your death, 
but only while a resident of the 
"residence premises;" and 
(2) with respect to your property, the 
person having proper temporary 
custody of the property until 
appointment and qualification of a 
legal representative. 
16. Cancellation. 
a. You may cancel this policy at any time by 
returning it to or by letting us know in 
writing of the date cancellation is to take 
effect; 
b. we may cancel this policy only for the 
reasons stated below by letting you know 
in writing of the date cancellation takes 
effect. The cancellation notice may be 
delivered to you or mailed through first 
class mail to your last address known to 
us. Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof 
of notice; 
(1) when you have not paid the premium, 
we may cancel at any time by letting 
you know at least 10 days before the 
date cancellation takes effect; 
(2) when this policy has been in effect for 
less than 60 days and is not a renewal 
with us, we may cancel for any reason 
by letting you know at least 10 days 
before the date cancellation takes 
effect; 
(3) when this policy has been in effect for 
60 days or more, or at any time if it is a 
renewal with us, we may cancel if: 
(a) there has been a material 
misrepresentation; or 
(b) the risk has changed substantially 
since the policy was issued, 
unless we could have reasonably 
foreseen the change or 
contemplated the risk in writing the 
policy; or 
(c) there has been a substantial 
breach of a contractual duty, 
condition or warranty. 
(4) when this policy is written for a period 
of more than one year or for an 
indefinite term, we may cancel for any 
reason at anniversary by letting you 
know at least 30 days before the date 
cancellation takes effect. 
c. when this policy is cancelled, the premium 
for the period from the date of cancellation 
to the expiration date will be refunded pro-
rata; 
d. if the return premium is not refunded with 
the notice of cancellation or when this 
policy is returned to us, we will refund it 
within a reasonable time after the date 
cancellation takes effect. 
17. Non-Renewal. We may elect not to renew this 
policy. If we elect not to renew, we will let you 
know in writing at least 30 days before the 
expiration date of this policy. The non-renewal 
notice may be delivered to you or mailed 
through first class mail to your last address 
known to us. Proof of mailing will be sufficient 
proof of notice, 
18. Non-duplication of Benefits, Limit of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance. 
a. No "insured", or other person, can recover 
benefits from the same elements of loss 
under this, or any other insurance, for an 
occurrence. 
b. Policies Issued by us to you: 
(1) if two or more insurance policies 
issued by us to you apply to the same 
occurrence, the total limits of liability 
under all such policies shall not 
exceed that of the policy with the 
highest limit of liability. 
Other Liability Coverage Available from 
Other Sources: 
(1) if other liability coverage applies, we 
are liable only for our share of the 
damages. Our share is the percent 
that the limit of liability of this policy 
bears to the total of all liability 
coverage applicable to the occurrence. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
- i 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID WILLIAMS AND DEANNA 
WILLIAMS 
Defendant 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Court of Appeals No. 20050618-CA 
1. This Appeal is from a final Order and Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City Department Hon. 
Lee Dever entered June 13, 2005. 
2. Appeal was taken to the Utah Supreme Court Pursuant to 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
pursuant to that Court's jurisdiction under UCA §78-2-2. 
The case was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to UCA §78-2-2(4). 
3. (a) Date of Entry of Final Order Appealed From: 6/13/05 
(b) Date Notice of Appeal was filed: 7/13/05 
(c) Dates of Post Judgment Motions: N/A 
4. Issues on Appeal 
Whether the trial court erred in expanding an exclusion 
from coverage for losses caused by vandalism or malicious 
mischief to include losses from arson contrary to established 
case law requiring exclusions in coverage contained in 
insurance contracts to be read narrowly. 
A. Relevant Case Authority 
American States Ins. Co. v. Rancho San Marcos Properties, LLC, 
97 P.3d 775 (Wash App. 2004). 
Battishill v. Farmers Alliance Insurance Co., 97 P.3d 620 (NM 
App. 2004) . 
Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Society, 111 P. 2d 1105 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Versaw, 99 P. 3d 796 (Utah 2004) 
Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (1975) 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., v. Sandt, 854 p.2d 519 
(Utah 1993). 
B. Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, 
the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable 
to the losing party below. And in determining whether those 
facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for 
the prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are 
reviewed for correctness. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
5. Summary of Relevant Facts 
The Williams are the owners of a small rental home located 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. In the summer of 2002, their last set 
of tenants damaged the interior of the home and moved out. The 
damage was to an extent that made it impracticable for the 
Williams to rent the property to someone else until substantial 
repairs were made to the property. Unfortunately at this time 
Mr. Williams was in Bankruptcy and there was no cash readily 
available to make the repairs. The property has been 
unoccupied since these last tenants moved out. 
During all of this time the Williams had the property 
covered with insurance purchased from Bear River Mutual. The 
Williams faithfully paid their premiums for what they were 
informed and perceived was fire insurance on the property. 
On July 3, 2003 a fire started in some debris located 
outside the back door to the property. The Salt Lake County 
fire inspector and the hired fire inspector for the Plaintiff 
have stated their opinion that the fire began in that location 
and that the cause of the fire was probably a hand held flame. 
The Williams asked Bear River to provide the fire 
insurance which they had purchased. Bear River has refused to 
provide the insurance and has instead claimed it owes the 
Williams nothing. The basis for this denial is the two pronged 
argument made in Bear River's Memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgement namely 1.) the policies stated 
exclusion for losses caused by vandalism or malicious mischief 
encompass claims for arson and/or 2.) that the structure was 
not used primarily for dwelling purposes. The parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment on these issues. The Trial 
Court granted Bear River's suiiimary judgment as to the first 
reason only and denied Defendants motions. 
6. Prior Appeals N/A 
DATED this 18th day of August, 2005 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY L.C. 
.^4 // £— 
Shawn D. Turner 
